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ABSTRACT 
 
In lawsuits about data breaches, the issue of harm has confounded courts. Harm is 
central to whether plaintiffs have standing to sue in federal court and whether their 
claims are viable. Plaintiffs have argued that data breaches create a risk of future 
injury from identity theft or fraud and that breaches cause them to experience 
anxiety about this risk. Courts have been reaching wildly inconsistent conclusions on 
the issue of harm, with most courts dismissing data breach lawsuits for failure to 
allege harm.  A sound and principled approach to harm has yet to emerge, resulting 
in a lack of consensus among courts and an incoherent jurisprudence.   
 
In the past five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has contributed to this confounding 
state of affairs. In 2013, the Court in Clapper v. Amnesty International concluded 
that fear and anxiety about surveillance – and the cost of taking measures to protect 
against it – were too speculative to constitute “injury in fact” for standing. The 
Court emphasized that injury must be “certainly impending” to warrant recognition. 
This past term, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo v. Robins issued an opinion aimed 
at clarifying the harm required for standing in a case involving personal data. But 
far from providing guidance, the opinion fostered greater confusion. What the Court 
made clear, however, was that “intangible” injury, including the “risk” of injury, 
could be sufficient to establish harm. In cases involving informational injuries, when 
is intangible injury like increased risk and anxiety “certainly impending” or 
“substantially likely to occur” to warrant standing? The answer is unclear.    
 
Little progress has been made to harmonize this troubled body of law, and there is 
no coherent theory or approach. In this essay, we examine why courts have struggled 
when dealing with harms caused by data breaches. The difficulty largely stems from 
the fact that data breach harms are intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse. Harms 
with these characteristics need not confound courts; the judicial system has, been 
recognizing intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse injuries in other areas of law.   
 
We argue that courts are far too dismissive of certain forms of data breach harm. In 
many instances, courts should find that data breaches cause cognizable harm. We 
explore how existing legal foundations support the recognition of such harm. We 
demonstrate how courts can assess risk and anxiety in a concrete and coherent way.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose that Company X fails to adequately secure its clients’ personal data. 
Imagine the company knows that hackers previously broke into its system yet did 
nothing about it. This time, hackers have little difficulty accessing the company’s 
computer network and steal sensitive personal data about thousands of individuals. 
In the hackers’ hands is now the key to those individuals’ credit and bank accounts: 
Social Security numbers, birth dates, and financial information. The company’s 
clients bring suit, seeking compensation for their increased risk of identity theft, the 
money they spent monitoring credit activity, and the ensuing emotional distress.  
 
The defining issue in this lawsuit will be harm. If plaintiffs bring suit in federal 
court, they will have to demonstrate that they suffered harm sufficient to establish 
Article III standing.
3
 Beyond the hurdle of standing, plaintiffs will have to establish 
harm to recover under tort, contract, or other claims in both federal and state courts.  
 
In the past two decades, plaintiffs in hundreds of cases have sought redress for data 
breaches caused by inadequate data security. In most instances, there is evidence that 
the defendants failed to use reasonable care in securing plaintiffs’ data. The majority 
of the cases, however, have not turned on whether the defendants were at fault. 
Instead, the cases have been bogged down with the issue of harm. No matter how 
derelict a defendant might have been with regard to security, no matter how much 
warning a defendant had about prior hacks and breaches, if plaintiffs cannot show 
harm, they cannot succeed in their lawsuit.  
 
The concept of harm stemming from a data breach has confounded the lower courts. 
There has been no consistent or coherent judicial approach to data breach harms. 
More often than not, a plaintiff’s increased risk of financial injury and anxiety are 
deemed insufficient to warrant recognition of harm,
4
 even though the law has 
evolved in other areas to redress such injuries.  
                                                 
3
 The issue of standing also comes up in state courts adjudicating data breach claims. See, e.g., Maglio 
v. Advocate Health, 40 NE3d 746, 752-753 (Ill. App. 2015) (explaining that federal standing 
principles are similar to those in Illinois and in turn dismissing data breach claims under Illinois law 
because risk of identity theft and emotional distress did not amount to injury in fact sufficient to 
support standing). 
4
 Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that increased risk of identity 
theft is too speculative a harm in case involving the theft of personal data from payroll processing 
firm); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., No. 14-1138, 2015 WL 1119724, at *5-8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015) 
(same); Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., No. 14-2872, 2015 WL 589561, at *4-7, *8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
11, 2015) (same); In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12-
347, 2014 WL 1858458, at *5-9, *14 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014) (same); Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 451, 469-71 (D.N.J. 2013) (same) with Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 2016 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16840 (6
th
 Cir. Sept. 16, 2016) (recognizing increased risk of identity theft and reasonably 
incurred mitigation costs to avoid future as harm warranting standing because hackers allegedly had 
stolen plaintiffs’ information and defendant offered free credit monitoring services to help consumers 
mitigate danger); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.2d 1139 (9
th
 Cir. 2010); In Re Home Depot Customer Data Security Breach 
Litig., 2016 WL 2897520 (N.D. Ga. May 17, 2016) (finding harm to plaintiff financial institutions to 
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The courts’ refusal to recognize data harms is, in no small part, due to confusion 
created by the Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International.
5
 In 
Clapper, attorneys, journalists, and human-rights activists challenged the 
constitutionality of a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
which expanded the government’s authority to conduct surveillance over suspected 
terrorists. Because the plaintiffs’ work involved communicating with foreign 
individuals who might be deemed suspicious by the government, the plaintiffs 
believed that their communications would be monitored. They spent significant 
money and time to protect the confidentiality of these communications, such as 
traveling abroad to speak with clients rather than talking to them on the phone.
6
  
 
As the Court in Clapper explained, standing requires plaintiffs to have suffered an 
“injury in fact”—injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent (as 
opposed to hypothetically possible). The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ 
theory of harm might be correct, but there was no proof that surveillance had, in fact, 
happened or was about to occur (or even that there was a substantial risk of it 
occurring in the future). The proof sought by the Court was absent because, 
according to the government, the surveillance program had to be kept secret. Thus, 
because plaintiffs had no definitive way to find out about the surveillance (until 
Edward Snowden forced the government’s hand months later), the harm was merely 
conjectural. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they could 
not show that the actual injury of government surveillance was underway or 
“certainly impending.” The plaintiffs’ case was dismissed because the plaintiffs 
could only speculate about whether their communications were under surveillance.
7
  
 
Although the Clapper Court focused on the fact that plaintiffs could not show that 
government surveillance was imminent or certainly impending, it stated in a footnote 
that, “in some instances,” a “substantial risk that the harm will occur would be 
sufficient to confer standing to plaintiff.”8  The Court failed to elaborate more on this 
point. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
warrant standing in case concerning hackers’ breach of Home Depot’s databases for costs undertaken 
to avoid future harm including costs to cancel and reissue cards, costs to investigate fraudulent 
charges, costs for customer fraud monitoring, and costs due to lost interest and fees due to reduced 
card usage). 
5
 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
6
 For a thoughtful analysis of Clapper, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
7
 The Clapper case comes with a dose of cruel irony. Although the government diminished the 
plaintiffs’ concerns about surveillance by arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove that they were 
subject to it, the government knew the answer all along, but because the program was classified as a 
state secret, the plaintiffs did not and could not know for sure that they were being subject to 
surveillance. See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance:” Intangible Injury in Fact in the 
Information Age, 18 U PA. J. CON. L. 745, 757 (2016).  
8
 Id. at 1150 n.5. In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court, quoting Clapper, held that “an 
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a 
substantial risk that the harm will occur.” 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). 
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In decision after decision, courts have relied on Clapper to dismiss data breach cases. 
For example, in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,
9
 the case on which the opening 
hypothetical is based, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not suffer harm 
because their “conjectures” about being victimized by identity theft or fraud had not 
yet “come true.” Plaintiffs’ concerns about increased risk of identity theft and their 
outlay of money to protect against such theft were based “on entirely speculative, 
future actions of an unknown third-party.”10 Because thieves had not yet misused the 
plaintiffs’ data, there was no “actual” harm to warrant standing or redress.11 The 
court summarily rejected the plaintiffs’ claims of emotional distress.   
 
Much like Reilly, the majority of courts have ruled that injuries from data breaches 
are too speculative and hypothetical, too based on subjective fears and anxieties, and 
not concrete and significant enough to warrant recognition.
12
 Courts have held that 
the “mere increased risk of identity theft or identity fraud alone does not constitute a 
cognizable injury.”13 They have refused to find harm even in cases where hackers 
used malware to steal personal data and there was evidence of misuse of the data.
14
 
Claims have been summarily dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs have not 
suffered identity theft or could not show an imminent threat of financial injury. 
 
Some courts, however, have pushed back against the trend and have found harm. The 
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found standing for victims of data breaches 
based on the increased risk of identity theft. In those cases, plaintiffs were found to 
have suffered actual, and not hypothetical, injuries where hackers stole personal data 
from inadequately secured systems.
15
 In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the 
                                                 
9
 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
10
 Id. at 42. 
11
 Id. at 43. 
12
 See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs., Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 13-7418, 2015 WL 1472483 
(D. N.J. Mar. 31, 2015); Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 589561 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 11, 2015); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 1119724 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015). 
13
 Green v. eBay Inc., --F.3d.3d--, 2015 WL 2066531 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015).  
14
 See, e.g., Bradix v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., 2016 WL 3617717 (E.D. La. July 6, 2016) 
(dismissing claims for lack of injury in fact in case where plaintiff alleged that defendant’s employee 
gave hacker employees’ names, Social Security Numbers, gross wages, and state where employees 
pay income taxes and that information was used in unauthorized attempts to secure vehicle financing 
appearing on plaintiff’s credit report because there was no proof that the attempts at fraud damaged 
plaintiff’s credit score); Alleruzzo v. Supervalu, Inc., 2016 WL 1588105 (April 20, 2016) (finding no 
harm to support standing even though plaintiffs alleged malicious software released and disclosed 
payment card names and PINs because the only alleged misuse of personal data was single 
unauthorized charge on one plaintiff’s credit card). 
15
 Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insur. Co., 2016 WL 4728027 (6
th
 Cir. 2016) (finding substantial risk 
of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs, supported standing in data breach case 
because theft of personal data by ill-intentioned criminals placed them at continuing, increased risk of 
fraud and identity theft and plaintiff suffered three unauthorized attempts to open credit cards in his 
name); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693-94 (7
th
 Cir. 2015) (finding that 
plaintiffs had standing to sue in the wake of breach even though they had not experienced fraudulent 
charges on their credit cards because those plaintiffs knew from the fact that other plaintiffs’ cards had 
been used fraudulently, that their personal information had been stolen by individuals who intended to 
misuse it); Krottner v. Starbucks, Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9
th
 Cir. 2010) (finding increased risk of 
identity theft constituted injury in fact where given that someone had attempted to use stolen personal 
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Seventh Circuit reasoned, “Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and 
steal consumers’ personal information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, 
sooner or later, to make a fraudulent charge or assume those consumers’ 
identities.”16 Trial courts have also held that plaintiffs faced a substantial risk of 
harm, sufficient to support standing, where the stolen data was posted on file-sharing 
websites for identity thieves.
17
 
 
Despite these decisions, the weight of authority has leaned against finding harm. 
Data breach lawsuits remained an area of unease, with courts struggling to develop a 
consistent and coherent approach. In data breach cases, the nature of the injury has 
seemingly befuddled the courts.     
 
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo v. Robins
18
 attempted to clarify the harm 
required for standing when injuries result from the mishandling of personal data. Yet 
far from providing guidance, the opinion fostered even more confusion about 
informational harms. In Spokeo, the plaintiff alleged that defendant, a “people search 
engine,” violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) when it published 
false information about him. The defendant’s dossier asserted that plaintiff was 
wealthy, married with children, and worked in a professional field though he was 
none of those things. Plaintiff alleged that the inaccuracies in defendant’s dossier 
damaged his employment chances by suggesting that he was overqualified or that he 
might be unwilling to relocate because of responsibilities to his non-existent family. 
The district court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under Article III 
because the alleged injury—defendant’s publication of inaccurate information—was 
too abstract.  
 
After the Ninth Circuit reinstated the plaintiff’s case on the grounds that an 
inaccurate credit report amounted to a particularized injury sufficient to support 
standing, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s writ for certiorari. In an opinion 
authored by Justice Alito, the Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the 
standing question. The Court declared that the harm required for standing must be 
“concrete,” yet it suggested that “intangible harm,” and even the “risk” of harm, 
could be sufficient to establish a concrete harm if intangible injury has a “close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a 
lawsuit in English or American courts.”   
 
                                                                                                                                          
data to open bank account using stolen personal data because plaintiffs had alleged a “credible threat 
of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of the laptop” with the unencrypted names, 
addresses, and Social Security Numbers of 97,000 employees); In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach 
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157-59 (D. Minn. 2014) (finding that unlawful charges, restricted or 
blocked access to bank accounts, inability to pay bills, and late payment charges or new card fees 
incurred by plaintiffs constituted injuries in fact in the wake of the theft of credit card and personal 
data of 110 million customers). 
16
 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
17
  
18
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The Court failed to elaborate on how all this added up. It said nothing about the 
relationship between the concreteness of harm and the need for at least a substantial 
risk of harm as discussed in Clapper. When will increased risk of injury constitute a 
“substantial risk of harm”?  Why are some intangible injuries sufficient for standing 
while others are not?  Spokeo did little to clear up the confusion about harms related 
to the mishandling of personal data. 
 
Clapper and Spokeo have led to confusion about how harms involving personal data 
should be conceptualized. Although this issue is at the heart of data breach cases, it 
has received little sustained scholarly attention.
19
 Debates about data breach harms 
rarely delve into the muddy conceptual waters. To many judges and policymakers, 
recognizing data breach harms is akin to attempting to tap dance on quicksand, with 
the safest approach being to retreat to the safety of the most traditional notions of 
harm.  
 
This issue cries out for attention. The number of people affected by data breaches 
continues to rise as companies collect more and more personal data in inadequately 
secured data reservoirs. Because companies do not have to internalize the negative 
externalities borne by individuals, the number of data breaches continues to grow. 
Data breaches have become an epic problem.  
 
In this Article, we focus on data breach harms. We explore why courts have 
struggled with the issue, and we offer an approach to address data breach harms that 
has roots in existing law. In what follows, we explore the nature of data breach 
harms and demonstrate how the law is far from closed off towards recognizing them. 
We show that there are ample conceptual foundations in the law to address risk and 
anxiety and thus to recognize data breach harms. In some areas, the law has been 
developing gingerly in the direction of recognizing concepts helpful to recognizing 
data breach harms; in other areas of the law, such concepts are widely-accepted yet 
remain sequestered from similar kinds of harm in other contexts. 
 
The past century has witnessed great advances in how the law deals with risk and 
anxiety. Risk is readily addressed, quantified, and factored into business decisions. 
Despite this progress, many courts in data breach cases seem to freeze in the 
headlights and find risk too difficult to assess. Ironically, the very companies being 
sued for data breaches make high-stakes decisions about cyber security based upon 
an analysis of risk. Indeed, in areas of law beyond data breach cases, courts have 
developed robust and concrete understandings of risk. Sufficient foundations in law 
exist for courts to assess increased risk of harm in data breach cases.  
 
                                                 
19
 Ryan Calo has done important work on privacy harms, setting out a theoretical framework to assess 
the boundaries of privacy harm. Ryan M. Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harms, IND. L. J. (2009). 
Under his account, the boundaries of privacy harms can be distilled to objective harms and subjective 
harms. Calo’s theoretical contributions are instructive to ours, though we look to historical common 
law doctrines for the foundation of data harms that can be recognized by courts. 
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Anxiety is also readily dismissed on the grounds that it is too speculative and 
insubstantial to serve as a basis of cognizable harm in data breach cases. In other 
contexts, however, courts routinely accept various forms of emotional distress, 
including anxiety, as sufficient harm. Indeed, in some areas, the issue of harm is not 
even discussed in most cases and is rarely an issue on appeal.
20
 For example, the 
privacy torts, recognized in the vast majority of states, allow plaintiffs to recover for 
disclosure of private information or for the improper intrusion into private matters 
resulting in emotional distress if the defendant’s conduct is “highly offensive to the 
reasonable person.” 21 The tort of breach of confidentiality recognizes emotional 
distress as a cognizable injury without the need to show highly offensive conduct.
22
   
 
If a news media site published a nude photo or sex video of a person without 
consent, the plaintiff could prevail without establishing financial losses or physical 
injury because the gravamen of the harm is emotional distress.
23
 Recently, the 
famous former pro-wrester Hulk Hogan won $115 million in compensatory damages 
from media site Gawker for posting a sex video involving him without his consent. 
In cases involving data breaches or improper sharing of data, however, claims of 
emotional distress are dismissed as insufficient without even a whisper of the 
extensive body of law under the privacy torts that establishes otherwise. Why does 
the embarrassment over a sex video amount to $115 million worth of harm but the 
anxiety over the loss of personal data (such as a Social Security number and financial 
information) amount to no harm?    
 
This Article has three parts. Part I discusses the way that courts are currently 
deciding cases involving data breach harms. In Part II, we explore why the law 
struggles with recognizing privacy and security violations as having caused 
cognizable harm. In Part III, we demonstrate that there are foundations in the law for 
a coherent recognition of harm based upon increased risk and anxiety. We build on 
this foundation, offering a framework for courts to assess risk and anxiety in a 
principled and consistent way.  
 
I. THE EMERGING LAW OF DATA HARMS 
 
Harm is indispensable to most private law claims. Generally speaking, “harm” is 
understood as the impairment, or set back, of a person, entity, or society’s interests.24 
People or entities suffer harm if they are in worse shape than they would be had the 
activity not occurred.
25
 Harm frustrates a person’ ability to “fashion a life . . . that is 
                                                 
20
 See infra Part II.B.2 
21
 See infra Part II.B.2 
22
 See infra Part II.B.2 
23
 See infra Part II.A.3 
24
 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1984) 
(explaining that harm involves the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of a person or entity’s 
interest). Competing accounts of harm argue that harm involves “events that are bad to suffer” or 
impose conditions that impair agency. Id. 
25
 Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM AND 
FULFILLMENT 3 (1992); Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
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distinctively and authentically hers.”26 Harms can involve the impairment of a 
person’s interest in physical integrity, “intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the 
absence of groundless anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage normally in 
social intercourse . . ., a tolerable social and physical environment, and a certain 
amount of freedom from interference and coercion.”27   
 
A “legally cognizable harm” is harm that the law recognizes as worthy of redress, 
deterrence, or punishment.
28
 Reasonable foreseeability of harm is a fundamental 
principle of much of private law.
29
 Plaintiffs must prove harm even if the defendant 
indisputably acted wrongly and violated the law. In tort suits, plaintiffs must prove 
that they were injured by the defendant’s actions. In The Common Law, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes identified harm as the evil against which tort law was directed.
30
 
Regardless of whether the defendant acted negligently, recklessly, or intentionally – 
no matter how wrongful the defendant’s conduct may have been – if harm is not 
proven, then plaintiffs cannot obtain relief.
31
 To be sure, legislation sometimes 
permits statutory damages or includes liquated damages provisions, which permit 
redress without additional showings of harm.
32
 The harm is understood as the 
interference with the right recognized in the statute, so long as the plaintiff has 
suffered some set back to tangible or intangible interests.
33
 . 
 
Beyond the substance of private law claims, federal courts require that plaintiffs have 
standing to bring suit in accord with Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Standing 
doctrine requires that, plaintiffs allege an “injury in fact.”34 The injury must be 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
                                                                                                                                          
1283, 1292 (2003) (exploring concepts of harm understood as interest with someone’s interest in a 
way that makes them historically worse off).  
26
 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 
5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 123-24 (1999). 
27
 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 37 (1984). 
28
 As Joel Feinberg explains, harms may involve invasions or setbacks to interests but not all 
invasions of interests are worthy of law’s attention. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1984). Law may ignore the wrongful behavior causing harm 
because the defendant acted justifiably or the targeted individual had no right to expect that his 
interests be protected. Id. at 34-35. 
29
 Gregory Keating, When is Emotional Distress Harm?, in TORT LAW: CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 
299 n. 89, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460072. 
30
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 64 (1881, reissued 1963); see Thomas C. Grey, 
Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1272 (2001) (exploring Holmes’s harm-based approach). 
31
 In certain circumstances, there may be distinct criminal laws and regulatory enforcement that would 
punish the defendant. In the absence of such penalties, the defendant can engage in the wrongdoing 
and violate the law without suffering any penalty.  
32
 Copyright law is a prime example of statutory damages without harm. 
33
 Spokeo v. Robins. Some statutes like the Privacy Act of 1974 require an additional showing of 
harm for individuals to bring suit. NASA v. Nelson. Similarly, some state Unfair and Deceptive 
Practice Acts (UDPA) permit consumers to seek compensation for losses caused by unfair and 
deceptive commercial practices only if those practices result in injury. See Danielle Keats Citron, The 
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
Because private UDAP claims require a showing of harm—whether or not statutes so require, courts 
routinely dismiss them. 
34
 Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).  
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hypothetical.”35 If a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim, a federal court cannot 
hear it. 
 
Although the requirements for standing and substantive causes of action are 
different, the issue of harm that undergirds both is strikingly similar. In most cases, 
the way courts think about harm for standing is nearly identical to the way courts 
approach harm in substantive claims. We focus on harm because it is central to the 
jurisprudence of private law claims.  
 
No matter whether harm is raised for the purposes of standing or determining the 
cognizability of private claims, harm drives the way courts think about data breach 
cases, most often resulting in their dismissal early in the litigation. Courts have found 
a lack of an “injury in fact” to support standing or have concluded that there is no 
harm caused by various torts or other causes of action. In this Part, we examine how 
courts have conceptualized harm in their rejection of these claims.   
A. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DATA BREACH HARMS 
 
Data breaches usually involve various types of personal data, such as financial 
account information, driver’s license numbers, biometric markers, and Social 
Security Numbers. The Office of Policy Management (OPM) breach leaked people’s 
fingerprints, background check information, and analysis of security risks.
36
 The 
Ashley Madison breach released information about people’s extramarital affairs.37 
The Sony breach involved employee email.
38
 The Target breach resulted in the 
leaking of credit card information, bank account numbers, and other financial data. 
Other breaches result in the disclosure of passwords, children’s information, location 
data, and medical records.  
 
Plaintiffs in data breach cases have pursued a number of causes of action, including 
negligence, privacy torts, and breach of fiduciary duty. Other claims assert violations 
of state unfair and deceptive commercial acts and practice statutes (UDAP laws), 
state data security laws, the federal Privacy Act, and the federal Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA). In a study of 230 data breach lawsuits between 2004 and 
2014, plaintiffs brought more than 86 different causes of action.
39
 
 
                                                 
35
 Id. 
36
 Kim Zetter and Andy Greenberg, Why OPM Is A Security and Privacy Debacle, WIRED, June 11, 
2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/06/opm-breach-security-privacy-debacle/;  
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/massive-opm-hack-actually-affected-25-million/. 
37
 Danielle Keats Citron & Maram Salaheldin, Leave Cheaters in Peace, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, August 
24, 2015, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/citron-salaheldin-leave-cheaters-peace-article-
1.2333852. 
38
 Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-
know/. 
39
 Sasha Romanosky, David A. Hoffman, and Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data 
Breach Litigation, 11 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 74 (2014). 
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Data breach cases are often filed in federal court or removed there from state court 
under the federal Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
40
 Under CAFA, class actions 
can be removed to federal court for state law claims exceeding five million dollars 
where at least one member of the putative class and one defendant reside in different 
states.
41
 At the federal level, harm thus must often be established twice – first to 
make it past the hurdle of standing and second to satisfy the elements of various 
causes of action. 
 
Although plaintiffs advance a number of theories of harm, at bottom, their claims are 
based on three overarching theories: (1) data breaches create a risk of future injury, 
(2) plaintiffs take preventative measures to reduce the risk of injury, and (3) 
plaintiffs experience anxiety as a result of data breaches compromising their personal 
data.     
 
1. Risk of Future Injury 
 
A common theory advanced by plaintiffs is that a data breach has increased their risk 
of future identity theft or fraud. The majority of courts reject that theory of harm. 
Plaintiffs’ increased risk of identity theft is regarded as too speculative a harm even 
in cases where thieves allegedly stole the personal data.
42
 Courts view the increased 
risk of identity theft not as an “actual injury” but rather as “speculation of future 
harm.”43  
 
The trend is that if a person’s personal data has not yet been used to commit identity 
theft or fraud, then courts find that plaintiffs have suffered no harm.
44
 In a case 
where plaintiffs’ sensitive financial data was accessed by unknown third parties, a 
federal district court dismissed the class suit alleging increased risk of identity fraud 
because plaintiffs’ “credit information and bank accounts look[ed] the same today as 
they did” before the breach.45 Because hackers had not opened new bank accounts or 
credit cards in plaintiffs’ names, there was no harm.46 This was true in Key v. DSW, 
                                                 
40
 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
41
 Id. 
42
 See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420 F. Supp.2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment in case involving the theft of personal data from defendant’s system 
because there was no indication that the information on the stolen computers had been misused); Guin 
v. Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., 2006 WL 288483 (D. Minn. 2006). 
43
 In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013); Hammer v. Sam’s 
East, Inc., 2013 WL 3746573 (D. Kan. July 16, 2013) (explaining that “[n]o court has found that a 
mere increased risk of ID theft or fraud constitutes an injury in fact for standing purposes without 
some alleged theft of personal data or security breach”). 
44
 See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011); Hammond v. Bank of New York, 
2010 WL 2643307 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. 
Oct. 3, 2006) (dismissing negligence claim in case involving hacking of defendant’s databases storing 
plaintiffs’ personal data because being at higher risk for fraud is insufficient harm to warrant 
standing). 
45
 Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp.3d 359, 366 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
46
 Id. at 367. 
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron  Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms 
 10 
Inc.,
47
 where thieves gained access to the defendant shoe retailer’s computer system 
containing the financial data of 96,000 customers.
48
 The court found no harm 
because plaintiffs only alleged the possibility of being victimized “at some 
unidentified point in the indefinite future.”49  
 
For some courts, there are simply too many contingencies at play, including the 
varied skills and intent of third-party hackers, to warrant a finding of harm.
50
 In 
Fernandez v. Leidos, Inc.,
51
 for instance, the district court dismissed plaintiff’s 
increased risk of harm in the wake of the theft of backup tapes with his personal data 
because the capabilities and criminal intentions of data thieves were speculative.
52
 
Even when plaintiffs quantify the extent to which the data breach has elevated their 
risk of future harm, courts still find that the harm too speculative to proceed.
53
 In In 
re Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft 
Litigation,
54
 the plaintiffs argued that they were nearly ten times more likely to be 
victimized by identity theft. The court found that the “degree by which the risk of 
harm has increased [wa]s irrelevant” because it failed to suggest that the harm was 
“certainly impending.” Another court sharpened the point, reasoning that identity 
theft was unlikely to happen in the future since the plaintiffs had not experienced 
fraud in the year after the breach.
55
 
 
Although three Courts of Appeal have recognized increased risk of harm as 
cognizable, these cases involved allegations about the malicious purpose of hackers 
and actual or attempted misuses of leaked personal data. In Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Group, the Seventh Circuit found the risk of harm “immediate and very real” 
because the data “was in the hands of hackers who used malware to breach the 
defendant’s systems” and “fraudulent charges had shown up on the credit cards of 
some of its customers.”56 Moreover, the defendant “contacted members of the class 
to tell them they were at risk,” which the court viewed as an admission that plaintiffs 
had suffered non-speculative harm.
57 
In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth 
                                                 
47
 454 F. Supp.2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
48
 Id. at 686. 
49
 Id. at 690. See also Bell v. Acxiom Corp., 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (dismissing 
negligence claim in case involving hacking of defendant’s databases storing plaintiffs’ personal data 
because being at higher risk for fraud is insufficient harm to warrant standing); 
50
 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42-43 (3d Cir. 2011). 
51
 127 F. Supp.3d 1078 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
52
 Fernandez, 127 F. Supp.3d at 1087, 
53
 Storm, 90 F. Supp.3d at 367. 
54
 No. MDL 2360, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). 
55
 Paytime, 90 F. Supp.3d at 367. 
56
 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group (7
th
 Cir. 2015), http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-
courts/ca7/14-3122/14-3122-2015-07-20.pdf?ts=1437415269; Danielle Keats Citron, Some Good 
News for Data Breach Plaintiffs, For A Change, FORBES, July 21, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2015/07/21/some-good-news-for-data-breach-victims-for-
a-change/. 
57
 Remijas; Lewart v. PF Chang’s, No. 14-3700, at 6 (7th Cir. April 16, 2016) (recognizing future risk 
of harm sufficient to recognize standing where hackers stole personal data from retailer). The Sixth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Galaria similarly pointed to the defendant’s provision of credit monitoring 
as supporting increased risk of harm. 
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Circuit conferred standing on the plaintiffs because there was a subsequent attempt 
to open a bank account with personal data following the theft of a laptop.
58
  
 
In most cases, however, increased risk of future injury fails as a theory of cognizable 
harm. The motives of those who obtained the data are unknown, and the plaintiffs 
have not yet suffered identity theft or other forms of financial fraud. It will not be 
clear who has the data or what they will do with it. Proving that the risk of harm is 
“certainly impending” is challenging because the harm from a data breach is not 
immediate. Even in many cases where hackers accessed personal data and their 
malicious motive can be inferred, courts have still refused to find harm.
59
   
 
2. Preventative Measures to Protect Against Future Injury 
 
A related theory based on future risk of injury is that plaintiffs incur out-of-pocket 
costs to mitigate the risk of identity theft or fraud. They spend time and money 
placing alerts with credit reporting agencies and subscribing to identity-theft 
protection and credit-monitoring services. They devote time and money to monitor 
various accounts; they have to go through the hassle of changing service providers to 
prevent further breaches. Plaintiffs contend that the cost of these measures presents a 
specific monetary value that can be associated with the improper exposure of 
personal data. Courts, however, often reject this theory of harm, viewing plaintiffs’ 
expenses as an attempt to “manufacture” injury.60  
 
The preventative measure theory of harm typically fails because it is based upon the 
increased risk of future injury theory. The concern of courts is that any plaintiff 
could find some measure to spend money to mitigate any risk. Said another way,  
monetary expenditures are viewed as too easy to manufacture. If such expenses were 
recognized as a cognizable injury, plaintiffs’ lawyers would just instruct their clients 
to spend time and money on mitigation measures, in turn creating harm. Having 
rejected the risk of future injury, courts reject the expenditure of time and money in 
the present to turn the risk of future injury into more cognizable monetary losses.   
 
3. Anxiety  
 
Plaintiffs have argued that data breaches caused them emotional distress (in 
particular, anxiety), but courts have rejected these claims nearly all the time. As a 
federal district court in New Jersey noted, courts “across the country have rejected 
emotional distress” as a basis for finding harm because plaintiffs’ fear of identity 
theft or fraud is based on speculative conclusions that personal data would be used in 
a malicious way.
61
 
 
                                                 
58
 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
59
 See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420 F. Supp.2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2008) and other cases 
discussed in notes 31 through 39. 
60
 See, e.g., Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc. (D. N.J. Dec. 26, 2013). 
61
 Crisafulli v. Ameritias Life Insur. Co., 2015 WL 1969173, at *4 (D. N.J. 2015). 
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron  Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms 
 12 
According to one court, “[p]laintiffs’ bald assertion of ‘emotional distress including 
anxiety, fear of being victimized, harassment and embarrassment’ is unexplained by 
any facts at all, let alone facts plausibly suggesting emotional injury.”62 One court 
stated, “even if [the risk of identity theft] is enough to engender some anxiety” and 
“even if their fears are rational,” plaintiffs lack standing “based on risk alone.”63 As 
another court concluded: “Emotional distress in the wake of a security breach is 
insufficient to establish standing.”64 Unless there is an “imminent threat” of personal 
data being used in a “malicious way,” plaintiffs’ anxiety and emotional suffering are 
viewed as “insufficient” to constitute harm.65 Most courts consider plaintiffs’ fear, 
anxiety, and psychic distress about their increased risk of identity theft and other 
abuses “too remote” to warrant recognition.66  
B.  CRAMPED VIEW OF HARM: VISCERAL AND VESTED   
 
As the previous section has shown, cases are dismissed for lack of harm even when a 
company’s negligence has clearly caused a data breach. Even in the face of wrongful 
conduct by defendants, courts are denying plaintiffs redress. The reason is because 
courts view the harm in overly narrow ways. Courts insist that data harms be 
visceral—easy to see, measure, and quantify. They require harms to be vested—
already materialized in the here and now. Plaintiffs must experience physical, 
monetary, or property damage or, at least, the damage must be imminent.  
  
This cramped understanding of harm harkens back to early conceptions of the 
common law. Nineteenth-century tort claims required proof of physical injury or 
property loss.
67
 Financial losses could be recovered in tort actions if defendants owed 
plaintiffs a special duty of care.
68
 Along these lines, courts have recognized claims 
for privacy violations only where redress is sought for tangible financial losses.
69
 
Courts have found a sufficient injury in data breach cases where the exposure of 
                                                 
62
 Crisafulli v. Ameritas Life Insurance Co., No. 13-5937, 2015 WL 1969176 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2015). 
63
 Science Applications International Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation, 45 F.Supp.3d 14, 26 
(D.D.C. 2014); see also Maglio v. Advocate Health & Hosps., 49 N.E.3d 746, 755 (Ill. App. 2015).  
64
 In Re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation, No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
2013). 
65
 Id. 
66
 Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
67
 Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY J. 293, 313 (2013). 
68
 The economic loss rule does not apply when defendant owe plaintiffs a special duty of care. 
69
 Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp.2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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personal data has led to identity theft.
70
 But without proof of physical harm or 
financial loss, courts rarely recognize harm.
71
  
 
Requiring harm to be visceral and vested has severely restricted the recognition of 
data harms, which rarely have these qualities. Data breach harms are not easy to see, 
at least not in any physical way. They are not tangible like broken limbs and 
destroyed property. Instead, the harm is intangible. Data breaches increase a person’s 
risk of identity theft or fraud and cause emotional distress as a result of that risk.  
 
Despite the intangible nature of these injuries, data breaches inflict real compensable 
injuries. Data breaches raise significant public concern and legislative activity. 
Would all this concern and activity exist if there were no harm? Why would more 
than 90% of the states pass data-breach notification laws in the past decade if 
breaches did not cause harm? Why would the Federal Trade Commission and state 
attorneys general devote considerable time and resources pursuing data breach 
cases?
72
 In short, if data breaches cause no harm, then why do federal and state law 
enforcement agencies devote resources to addressing them? 
 
Data breach harms might be akin to invisible objects in the middle of a crowded 
room. We may not be able to see an invisible object, but we see how everyone is 
bumping into it, how they are changing where they stand because of it, how they are 
walking different routes to avoid it, and so on. The object is invisible to the naked 
eye, but it is having a significant effect and people are expending a lot of time and 
energy to deal with it. To understand its impact, the best approach is not to look 
directly at it. Instead, we need to look at the activity generated by it and around it. 
The same is true with data breach harms. When data breach harms are studied in 
isolation, the real harm can be difficult to see. As with the invisible object, one must 
step back and observe the reactions to the data breach. 
 
As we explore in Part II, in other areas of the law, conceptions of harm have evolved 
to recognize injury that is hard to see or measure. This is true for pain and suffering, 
loss of consortium, and other matters that are not easily translated into monetary 
terms. This is true for emotional distress and risk-oriented injuries. Law has 
developed ways to arrive at dollar figures for these harms, and they should evolve to 
do so in context of data breach harms.   
                                                 
70
 Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11
th
 Cir. 2012). It can, however, be difficult to pinpoint a 
single actor for the harm suffered in the wake of a data breach. There are many participants that 
contribute to the harm experienced by identity theft victims: the entities that leaked the data, the 
companies that allow thieves to open up accounts in victims’ names, and the credit reporting agencies 
that assemble the faulty information and use it to report on people’s reputations. Chris Hoofnagle, 
Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J. L. TECH. 1 (2009). When victims attempt to clean up their 
credit reports, they are often prevented from doing so by uncooperative credit reporting agencies and 
creditors. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/big-credit-reporting-agencies-to-overhaul-
error-fixing-process.html?_r=0 
71
 In Re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 4 A.3d 492 (Sup. Ct. Me. 
2010). 
72
 See Citron, State Attorneys General, supra note. 
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II. RISK AND ANXIETY AS HARMS 
 
The nature of data breach harms is a complex issue that has not been accorded 
adequate consideration in cursory judicial explanations. In this Part, we explore why 
courts are struggling with risk and anxiety, the key dimensions to data breach harms. 
We contend that these harms are far from fanciful or trivial. Data breach harms are 
real, and compelling reasons exist for recognizing them. In this Part, we demonstrate 
that contrary to findings that no legal basis exists to recognize harm arising out of 
data breaches, there is significant basis in legal doctrine to recognize data breach 
harms. These precedents involve other bodies of law, some closely related to the law 
of data breaches. Rather than ignoring these legal foundations for recognizing harm, 
courts should build upon them. Doing so would ensure conceptual coherence to the 
judiciary’s approach. Moreover, the existence of these other areas of law that 
recognize similar types of harm demonstrates that data breach harms can be 
recognized without causing calamity in the law. 
A. RISK AS HARM 
 
1. Understanding Risk 
 
In data breach cases, courts have difficulty with the concept of risk. Fraud may not 
surface until after an identity thief combines leaked personal data with other 
information. Because the downstream use of improperly obtained personal data is 
not known at the time of the breach and because it depends upon the aggregation of 
disparate sources of personal data, courts have difficulty conceptualizing the harm. 
 
What does that risk entail? Years after personal data is leaked, identity theft victims 
have faced financial ruin. Identity thieves plunder people’s credit, riddling their 
credit reports with false information including debts and second mortgages obtained 
in their names. Victims struggling with identity theft have been forced to file for 
bankruptcy, and some have lost their homes.
73
 Victims are turned down for loans or 
end up paying higher interest rates on credit cards.
74
 Their utilities are cut off and 
their services denied.
75
 Identity thieves can use stolen health information to obtain 
medical care, saddling individuals with hefty hospital bills and a thief’s treatment 
records.
76
 Victims incur legal fees and have to cover bounced checks. In 2012, the 
average cost of repairing identity theft was $1,769, and the median loss was three 
hundred dollars.
77
 On average, it takes up to thirty hours to resolve problems when 
                                                 
73
 http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/identity-theft-
growing/2082179/ 
74
 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Victims of Identity Theft, 2012,” December 2013, at 7 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf. 
75
 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf. 
76
 Citron, Reservoirs, supra note. 
77
 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Victims of Identity Theft, 2012,” December 2013, at 6, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf. 
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identity thieves open new accounts in victims’ names.78 To be sure, some types of 
data harms are more quickly realized. Payment card fraud, for example, usually 
occurs shortly after payment card data is compromised. Because card numbers get 
cancelled quickly, fraudsters act very fast.
79
   
 
The problem with identity theft is that personal data cannot readily be “cancelled” or 
changed like a credit card number. Social Security numbers are difficult to change. 
Other personal data such as birth date and mother’s maiden name cannot be changed. 
Biometric data such as fingerprints or eye scans, health information, and genetic data 
cannot be exchanged or cancelled. A criminal may obtain a victim’s personal data 
and use it months or years later; the data will still be useful for committing fraud. 
 
As Michael Sussmann, a lawyer in Perkins Coie’s privacy and data security practice, 
explains: “The data is sold off, and it could be a while before it’s used. . . . There’s 
often a very big delay before having a loss.”80 Similarly, Ed Mierzwinski, the federal 
Consumer Program Director and Senior Fellow for U.S. PIRG, notes:  
 
Credit card numbers and debit card numbers have a short shelf life, because 
banks figure out which cards are at risk, and people get new numbers without 
asking for them. . . . Social Security Numbers have a very long shelf life -- a bad 
guy that's smart won’t use it immediately, he’ll keep a hoard of numbers and use 
them in a couple of years.  
 
Harm may occur well beyond the statute of limitations, and the timing of the harm 
might be different for each victim.  
 
Another challenge for assessing data breach harms is the great difficulty in catching 
identity thieves. Without information about where an identity thief obtained the data, 
a plaintiff will have difficulty linking the harm to a particular data breach or data 
disclosure.
81
 Ironically, the very factors that make identity theft so harmful – the 
difficulty in catching the perpetrators and the fact that it can continue indefinitely – 
are what impede victims’ ability to obtain redress in the courts.  
 
Data breach victims incur out of pocket costs to minimize future losses. They 
purchase identity theft protection services and insurance to minimize the impact of 
fraud. The opportunity costs are real. Individuals spend time monitoring their 
accounts, which pulls them away from their jobs. In cases involving privacy 
violations and inadequate data security, consumers bear the lion’s share of these 
costs because courts view them as too attenuated to recognize as harm.  
                                                 
78
 Id. at 10.  
79
 Andrea Peterson, Data Exposed in Breaches Can Follow People Forever, WASH. POST, June 15, 
2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2015/06/15/data-exposed-in-breaches-
can-follow-people-forever-the-protections-offered-in-their-wake-dont/ 
80
 Id.  
81
 Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in SECURING 
PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 112 (Anupam Chander, Lauren Gelman, and Margaret Jane Radin, 
eds. 2008). 
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It is rational to spend time and money to mitigate the possibility of harm in the 
future. Insurance exists for this very purpose. There are numerous products and 
services aimed at risk mitigation. Indeed, after data breaches, organizations often 
offer affected individuals free credit monitoring. State attorneys general often insist 
that companies pay consumers one to two years of credit monitoring and identity 
theft insurance after a security breach.
82
   
 
Another component of the data breach harm involves a chilling of a person’s ability 
to engage in life’s important activities. An increased risk of identity theft might 
prevent a person from buying a new house. Identity theft, when it occurs, pollutes a 
person’s credit report, making it difficult if not impossible to obtain a loan. In the 
face of a greater risk of identity theft, a person might be reluctant to take the steps 
necessary to buy a home, such as placing an existing home on the market, going 
house hunting, and making an offer with a deposit. Why take those expensive and 
time-consuming steps if there is a chance that her credit report might be damaged 
and thus put at risk her deposit on a home? Why sell one’s current home if one 
would be unable to buy a new one due to a marred credit report? Credit reports take a 
long time to fix, and so it is a legitimate concern that the person might not be able to 
find housing to rent while cleaning up her credit report, since the report is essential 
to obtain a rental agreement.
83
 Given these significant risks, a person might delay 
buying a new house. 
 
The same concerns are true for employment. In the face of a heightened risk of 
identity theft, a person might delay looking for a new job because a polluted credit 
report can interfere with a person’s employment opportunities. A person might not 
want to go through the time and effort of applying for a position if there is an 
increased chance that future employers will find her credit report marred by a thief’s 
financial mischief. Seeking a new job could jeopardize one’s current employment so 
a reasonable person might not chance losing a current job in the face of an elevated 
risk that it will be difficult to obtain a new one. Then too, a person might be chilled 
from seeking a job that requires a security clearance.  
 
Just as people might rationally delay an outdoor party when the forecast calls for a 
greater chance of rain, people might delay certain important life decisions when their 
risk of a sullied credit report increases.   
 
                                                 
82
 Press Release, AG Jepsen to Anthem: End Unreasonable Delays in Providing Information to 
Affected Residents, February 10, 2015 http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?Q=560660&A=2341 
(demanding that Anthem inform affected consumers within 24 hours that they are going to be 
provided two years of credit monitoring and identity theft insurance to consumers impacted by data 
breach). 
83
 Consumers Union, Big Three Credit Bureaus Settle with 31 States Over Credit Reporting Mistakes, 
May 26, 2015, http://consumersunion.org/2015/05/big-3-credit-bureaus-settle-with-31-states-over-
credit-reporting-mistakes/ (explaining that one in five consumers have an error in credit reports). 
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Does a future risk of injury constitute real harm? It might be hard to see, but consider 
the following analogy. Imagine that a person owns two identical safes. She wants to 
sell them and lists them on eBay: 
 
SAFE FOR SALE 
Made of the thickest iron with the most unbreakable lock. 
 
SAFE FOR SALE 
Made of the thickest iron with the most unbreakable lock. However, the 
combination to the safe was improperly disclosed and others may know it. 
Unfortunately, the safe’s combination cannot be reset. 
 
Which safe would get the higher price? 
 
Safe 2 is no longer as good as Safe 1. Its utility has been damaged by the improper 
disclosure of the combination to the safe, and thus the value of the safe has been 
significantly reduced. 
 
Or suppose there is a new virus that does not cause adverse effects but that makes 
people more vulnerable to getting a painful disease later on. Many people will not 
develop the painful disease, only some will fall prey to it. Nonetheless, those with 
the virus are at greater risk to develop the painful disease. Has the person who has 
contracted the virus suffered harm?   
 
In the case of the safe combination and the virus, people are made more vulnerable; 
they are placed in a weakened and more precarious position. Their risk level has 
increased. They are worse off than before the release of a safe’s combination number 
or the exposure to a virus. In the immediate present, the increased risk exposure is 
undesirable, anxiety producing, and frustrating. In cases involving an increased risk 
of future harm, not all individuals will actually suffer that harm, but “each has 
suffered a loss in an actuarial sense because his chances of avoiding the harm have 
been reduced.”84   
 
People have a meaningful interest in avoiding risk.
85
 They will go to the doctor to 
monitor their health. They will pay for insurance to insure against particular risks. 
Indeed, the insurance market is proof that protection against risk has a monetary 
value. 
 
Although there are sophisticated ways to assess and understand risk, many courts 
have refused recognize risk as a cognizable harm in data breach cases. Risk is a 
central concept toward making more intelligent and practical decisions. As Justice 
                                                 
84
 David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for a Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE L. REV. 605, 633 (2001). See 
Zehner v. Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991 (Oakl. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing tort recovery as 
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85
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Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, “the man of the future is the man of 
statistics and the master of economics."
86
 And in many areas, law has recognized risk 
as a legally cognizable harm. 
 
2.  Legal Foundations for Recognizing Risk as a Cognizable Harm 
 
Data breach harms may push on the edges of the law, but ample foundations and 
significant flexibility exist in the law to recognize them. The law has evolved to 
recognize risk. This trend is likely driven by the fact that modern thinking in science 
and business, among other domains, is deeply focused on risk. Because the 
conceptual underpinnings for recognizing data harms are already present in the law, 
recognizing such harms does not require a radical shift in legal conceptions of harm. 
Risk so pervades modern thinking that law cannot resist embracing the concept if it 
is to remain relevant. 
 
The law has grown in its recognition of future injury.
87
 Over time, probabilistic 
injuries have been recognized in three conceptually related areas: increased risk of 
injury, loss of a chance, and fear of disease.
88
 Tort law has developed to recognize 
the “fear of or the increased risk of developing a disease in the future” and “lost 
chances to avoid diseases or physical injury” as compensable injuries.89 For these 
claims, the harm is the destruction of a future opportunity and the loss of hope.
90
  
 
Courts have begun allowing people to sue for medical malpractice that results in the 
loss of an “opportunity to obtain a better degree of recovery.”91 Under risk of future 
harm cases, damages include those “directly resulting from the loss of a chance of 
achieving a more favorable outcome,” as well as damages “for the mental distress 
from the realization that the patient’s prospects of avoiding adverse past or future 
harm were tortiously destroyed or reduced,” and damages “for the medical costs of 
monitoring the condition in order to detect and respond to a recurrence or 
complications.”92 For example, in Petriello v. Kalman,93 a physician made an error 
that damaged the plaintiff’s intestines. The plaintiff was estimated to have between 
an 8% to 16% chance that she would suffer a future bowel obstruction. The court 
concluded that the plaintiff should be compensated for the increased risk of 
developing the bowel obstruction “to the extent that the future harm is likely to 
occur.”94  
 
                                                 
86
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87
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88
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 Id. at 155. 
90
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 Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.3d 1103 (N.H. 2001). See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 963, 970-90 (2003). 
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Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron  Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms 
 19 
Similarly, environmental law is premised on the notion of risk as harm. “One of the 
major innovations of environmental law has been to substitute the concept of risk as 
a proxy for injury for the common law’s insistence that injury be established by 
proof that an action in fact caused demonstrable harm.”95 Courts have found 
increased risk of disease sufficient for standing purposes and as the basis of 
regulation.
96
 
 
To be sure, if remedies for increased risk of injury were applied broadly, many kinds 
of vulnerabilities would be prohibited. A driver who operates his car recklessly 
increases other drivers’ potential to get into an accident. It would be difficult to 
imagine the law recognizing increased risk as harm due to reckless driving. In other 
cases, however, the law provides a remedy for increased risk of developing health 
complications due to medical malpractice. Why the different result?  Once the 
reckless driver passes by traffic without getting into an accident, the risk has been 
eliminated. By contrast, the risk of developing future complications from medical 
malpractice may have no clear end in sight.  
 
The risk of injury in a data breach case is closer to the medical malpractice scenario 
than the reckless driver. To the individuals whose personal data is leaked into the 
hands of thieves, the risk of harm is continuing. Hackers may not use the personal 
data in the near term to steal bank accounts and take out loans. Instead, they may 
wait until an illness befalls a family member and then use personal data to generate 
medical bills in a victim’s name. They may use the personal data a year later but only 
use some individuals’ personal information for fraud. Although not all of the 
personal data will be used for criminal ends, some will. In the meanwhile, the 
individuals worry that their information will be misused and expend time and 
resources to protect themselves from this possibility.  
 
Long-term risk is not a harmless wrong unlike the risky driver who does not hurt 
anyone. It is not negligence “in the air,” which the law has long understood as 
unworthy of a legal response.
97
 There is an injury; it is not a regrettable close call 
like the reckless driver who hits no one. When an entity inadequately secures 
personal data and thieves steal it, the entity’s unreasonable actions impact a sizeable 
number of users, often in the millions, and the excess risk of fraud is certain to take 
its toll on a number of those users. Over time, the risk will materialize for a 
percentage of those users. Although the eventual victims cannot be immediately 
identified, the entity cannot deny the reality of the loss it has inflicted. 
 
Law’s recognition of risk of future harm was arguably anticipated by the Court in 
Robins v. Spokeo when the Court noted that intangible informational injuries, 
                                                 
95
 Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 897, 908 
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96
 Due Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1974); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
97
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Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron  Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms 
 20 
recognized in common law, can provide the basis for harm sufficient to support 
standing. As shown by judicial doctrine related to lost chances, the common law has 
come to recognize increased risk of harm as an intangible injury worthy of redress.  
 
There are practical implications of denying increased risk as a cognizable harm in 
data breach cases. If increased risk is not understood as harm, then when the risk 
materializes, such as when the identity theft occurs, plaintiffs probably will be 
unable to sue at all. Statute of limitations would likely bar any lawsuit. Even if 
statute of limitations is not a bar, delay in resolving the issue may lead to the loss of 
evidence.  
 
In many other contexts, high-stakes decisions are based on risk, a fact that makes it 
difficult to understand why law should be an exception. Legal decisions are not 
necessarily more important than decisions in other domains; nor are people in the 
law inherently less capable of comprehending risk. Despite the law’s caution and 
temerity with risk, it has been making significant steps toward embracing risk 
concepts. Risk-oriented harm has increasingly been recognized by the law, which has 
been catching up to more modern understandings of risk management. Changes in 
risk level have significant financial repercussions, and there are concrete and 
sophisticated approaches to evaluating, monetizing, and managing risk. Thus, the 
foundation is present for a more robust understanding of data breach harm.   
B. ANXIETY AS HARM 
 
1. Understanding Anxiety 
 
Data breach harms often result in victims experiencing anxiety about the increased 
risk of future harm. Anxiety is a form of emotional distress, which is an umbrella 
term to capture a wide array of negative and disruptive feelings such as sadness, 
embarrassment, and anxiety, among others. With a data breach, anxiety is 
experienced in the present, but courts are reluctant to recognize emotional distress as 
a cognizable injury arising out of data breach harms.  
 
A concern with recognizing emotional distress in data breach cases is that psychic 
distress can be readily manufactured. Arguments against the recognition of anxiety 
focus on the fact that claims of anxiety are easy to make and difficult to dispute. 
Plaintiffs will quickly learn to make poignant statements about their anguish, with 
statements exaggerating their distress. Defendants may have difficulty disproving 
plaintiffs’ accounts of their own subjective mental states. 
 
Concerns over disingenuous claims of emotional distress as well as the difficulty in 
disproving such claims are certainly significant. But as we demonstrate in the next 
Part, the law has evolved to recognize emotional distress disconnected from physical 
or financial injury. In certain privacy cases, courts recognize pure emotional distress 
without hesitation, most likely, we posit, because courts recognize that most people 
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would feel emotional distress in these situations. In essence, an unstated objective 
test to emotional distress seems to exist in privacy tort cases.  
 
Many other areas of law involve proving subjective mental states. Indeed, the vast 
majority of criminal law involves subjective mental states that must be proven with 
the highest standard of proof – beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the challenges, 
the law quite often involves a quest to delve into the truth of what was going on in a 
person’s mind.   
 
A data breach can quite appropriately result in victims feeling anxiety. Leaks of 
personal data can cause embarrassment or result in fraudulent transactions. The most 
common preventative measure given to people is credit monitoring, but this cannot 
inoculate data breach victims against future injury. Credit monitoring merely informs 
people about anomalies in their credit reports after theft has occurred. It does not 
prevent the misuse of data. By analogy, credit monitoring is akin to a blood-
screening test for cancer. The test might indicate that a person has cancer, but the test 
is not a cure. Nor does routinely testing a person for cancer address the emotional 
suffering as a result of a person’s increased risk of developing cancer.   
 
Credit monitoring cannot totally alleviate a person’s anxiety. Although credit 
monitoring will detect fraud appearing on a person’s credit report, not all fraud will 
be documented in a victim’s credit report. Fraudulent uses of leaked personal data 
that does not involve credit will often not be reported on a credit report. A credit 
report, for instance, will not alert a data breach victim that a thief used her leaked 
personal information to empty her bank accounts. It will not notify a data breach 
victim that a fraudster has used her leaked login credentials to access private files on 
her computer or use her computer to send out spam.   
 
Data breaches can create a cascade of compromised accounts, especially if they 
involve personal data about password recovery questions. Because there is no ready 
expiration date on the misuse of compromised personal data, criminals can at any 
point use that information to defraud victims. Anxiety about this increased risk, 
which often cannot be fully reduced, is a legitimate, real, and discomfiting 
experience.   
 
Anxiety over a data breach is often dismissed as the irrational feelings of abnormally 
anxious people. But it is rational for people to feel anxiety about the fact that their 
personal data is in the hands of criminals who can cause their financial ruin. A 
blizzard of laws protects data security, a reality that demonstrates that data breaches 
are not a trivial matter to legislatures. The media often report on data breaches, and it 
is rational to assume that the media is paying attention because data breaches cause 
some kind of harm. Otherwise, why report on something that should generate no 
worries or concerns?    
 
People are often advised to take steps to protect their personal data, such as Social 
Security Numbers. They are told to shred documents with sensitive personal data and 
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to avoid carrying such data around in their wallets. Rational people would assume 
that these measures are meant to prevent something harmful from happening. 
Otherwise, why bother if there is nothing to worry about? It seems reasonable for a 
person to respond to a data breach with anxiety in light of all the attention and 
concern given to data breaches. So many laws and so much focus is not typically 
given to something that is benign. Moreover, many organizations stress that keeping 
personal data secure is very important to them. If failing to do so should not cause 
people any anxiety, then why bother promising to keep the data secure? It would be 
absurd for policymakers to worry about data breaches if victims have nothing to be 
concerned about.    
 
2. Legal Foundations for Recognizing Anxiety as Harm 
 
Ample foundations exist in the law to recognize anxiety as a cognizable harm. There 
was a time when pure emotional distress was discounted because it seemed too 
ethereal, too difficult to measure, too easy to fake.
98
 That view of emotional distress 
faded in the mid-twentieth century. It has been replaced by a much greater and 
growing acceptance of emotional distress as a cognizable harm.    
 
The law has grown to recognize so-called “ethereal” harms.99 In some instances, the 
recognition of emotional distress traces its roots back before the modern era. The 
intentional tort of assault redressed emotional distress without any showing of 
physical injury.
100
 Relational torts like the alienation of affection, of a similar 
vintage, permitted compensation for emotional distress.
101
 
 
Privacy law’s roots supported the recognition of emotional distress as a compensable 
injury in the early twentieth century. In The Right to Privacy,
102
 Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis spent considerable energy discussing the evolving nature of harm, 
from tangible to intangible injuries. “[I]n early times,” they contended, “the law gave 
a remedy only for physical interference with life and property.”103 Subsequently, the 
law expanded to recognize incorporeal injuries; “[f]rom the action of battery grew 
that of assault. Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against 
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 Samuel L. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
103
 Id. at 193. 
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offensive noises and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law 
of nuisance was developed.”104 Property developed to include “every form of 
possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”105 Defamation law protected reputations 
without requiring proof of financial or physical suffering. The harm involved a 
person’s good name rather than a tangible loss.106  
 
In tracing law’s development surrounding the nature of harm, Warren and Brandeis 
were paving the way for the legal recognition of remedies for privacy invasions, 
which primarily involved an “injury to the feelings.”107 Warren and Brandeis 
identified the legally protected interest set back by privacy invasions as a person’s 
ability to develop her “inviolate” personality.108 Privacy invasions inflicted harm by 
interfering with a person’s ability to decide the extent to which her personal 
information would be revealed, shared, and disclosed to others. Warren and Brandeis 
noted that privacy invasions interfered with a person’s “estimate of himself,” 
inflicting “mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily 
injury.”109  
 
In the century following the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, the law 
grew to recognize privacy torts because emotional tranquility was an interest 
deserving protection.
110
 Courts recognized that emotional distress could be “as 
severe and debilitating as physical harm.”111 Privacy tort claims have succeeded in 
garnering compensation for emotional distress.
112
 Plaintiffs have prevailed in cases 
involving the dissemination of nude photos,
113
 before and after photos of plastic 
surgery patients,
114
 and autopsy or death scene photos of loved ones.
115
 Courts do not 
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question the harm in those cases, even though it involves intangible injury.
116
  
Indeed, with corpse photos, courts recognize that the photos implicate the privacy 
rights not of the subject of the photos (the dead person) but of the deceased person’s 
family members.
117
  
 
The privacy torts readily allow for emotional distress damages alone. As David Elder 
aptly notes in his treatise Privacy Torts, decisions on the public disclosure of private 
fact tort “collectively reject any suggestion that special damages or physical injuries 
are a threshold pre-condition to recovery.”118 Elder explains that courts have 
permitted harms such as “injury to feelings or sensibilities; feelings of violation and 
mortification; fear for physical security; . . . past or future humiliation; [and] 
embarrassment,” among other things.119 According to the Restatement of Torts, 
plaintiffs can recover for purely emotional distress harm.
120
 As one court put it, 
plaintiffs are “entitled to recover substantial damages, although the only damages 
suffered resulted from mental anguish.”121  
 
Under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, mental distress is “recoverable without 
the necessity of showing actual physical injury because the injury is essentially 
subjective, not actual harm to the body.”122 As a court noted: “The difficulty of 
measuring damages for invasion of privacy is no reason for denying relief.”123 Elder 
observes that “since the gravamen of the tort is ‘injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, 
and the mental anguish and distress caused thereby,’ the plaintiff is generally entitled 
to collect substantial damages, ‘damages of real worth and importance,’ for 
emotional distress without any proof of special damages or physical or otherwise 
debilitating psychic injury.”124 
 
Courts have also recognized emotional harm for the breach of confidentiality tort. 
The law recognizes that disclosures of information made in confidential relationships 
involve “harms of broken trust, betrayal, and disrupted expectations of secrecy.”125 
Suppose a doctor improperly breaches patient confidentiality and reveals the 
patient’s medical data to another person. The data is not embarrassing; the patient is 
in good health, and there is nothing embarrassing revealed and no reputational 
damage done. Is the patient harmed? Courts readily recognize harm under these 
circumstances. The harm involves the betrayal of trust in socially-desirable 
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professional relationships. As Elder notes, the “permissible damages are broad and 
parallel those available under the intrusion and other privacy torts.”126 Additionally, 
in other contexts, courts accept emotional distress damages based solely upon the 
plaintiff’s testimony, such as in employment discrimination cases.127  
 
In case after case involving the privacy torts and breach of confidentiality tort, courts 
have recognized harm based on pure emotional distress or psychological impairment. 
Fear, anxiety, embarrassment, and loss of trust are all recognized as harms.
128
 
Humiliation, nervousness, worry, and loss of sleep are understood as compensable 
harms.
129
  
 
The inconsistency between these different contexts is quite stark. Bodies of tort 
jurisprudence are entirely ignored in cases involving data breach harms. Courts do 
not distinguish these cases; they simply do not mention them, as if those cases did 
not exist as precedent. Hardly any attempt is made to reconcile them.  In contrast to 
cases involving data breaches, cases involving the privacy torts and breach of 
confidentiality tort lack the judicial hand wringing and angst over the recognition of 
emotional harm. 
 
The common law has also recognized claims for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as well as for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
130
 Claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress initially were limited to cases involving 
physical injury, but that rule eased over time. In the past fifty years, courts have 
deemphasized the “directness of the physical injury” and emphasized the “reality of 
the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff.”131 Courts have recognized negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claims where the emotional distress occurs in the 
context of relationships that impose independent, pre-existing duties of care.
132
  
 
Relevant to data breach cases, in a series of cases, courts have permitted emotional 
distress damages for fear of contracting diseases. Courts have held that plaintiffs can 
recover for fear of contracting AIDS, even if they do not yet have AIDS and even if 
they are not HIV positive.
133
 For example, in Johnson v. West Virginia University 
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Hospitals,
134
 the court held that a security guard could sue for emotional distress 
caused by the fear of contracting AIDS after being bitten by an AIDS patient. 
Although a majority of courts require plaintiffs to prove actual exposure to HIV,
135
 a 
number of courts do not require exposure to HIV to warrant recovery for emotional 
distress.
136
 Courts have also permitted emotional distress damages based on fear of 
contracting cancer. In one case, a court held that the plaintiff’s fear of getting cancer 
after being exposed to asbestos was reasonable and actionable.
137
   
 
The harm from an increased risk of identity theft is akin to the risk of contracting a 
chronic disease. The risk of a data breach is ongoing. Data breach notification letters 
explicitly inform people that there is a risk of identity theft. Credit monitoring 
services are offered for one or two years, signaling to plaintiffs an increased risk of 
theft for that time period. When a person has a reasonable belief that her credit 
identity is in jeopardy, she is rightly afraid that her creditworthiness is out of her 
hands. The exposure to the risk of identity theft can be anxiety-inducing because 
identity theft can have catastrophic effects on an individual’s life and because it is 
difficult to resolve. The passage of time may not dissipate that fear because identity 
theft can happen at any time. A person’s financial and employment opportunities can 
be destroyed by identity theft, and time and money are essential to addressing it. In 
all of these ways, identity theft is the digital equivalent to contracting a chronic 
disease.  
 
The clear direction and thrust of the law is towards a greater recognition of 
emotional distress. In various contexts, the law has increasingly recognized pure 
emotional distress as cognizable harm. Negligent infliction of emotional distress has 
moved beyond the narrow confines of physical harm to extend to certain 
relationships requiring a duty of care.
138
 These bodies of law have laid the 
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foundation to extend emotional distress damages to cases involving inadequate 
security.
139
       
 
Thus, there is a robust basis in the law to recognize the intangible nature of data 
breach harms. In tort cases, courts have recognized emotional distress alone as 
sufficient for harm. These cases typically involve privacy torts and breach of 
confidentiality rather than negligence. Nonetheless, the precedent is there to 
recognize emotional distress as cognizable harm in data breach cases. In contract 
cases, courts recognize the value of preferences without economic value.  
 
III. AN APPROACH FOR ASSESSING RISK AND ANXIETY  
 
Many courts reject risk and anxiety as cognizable harms based upon concerns about 
the difficulty of assessing and quantifying a dollar value to risk and anxiety. Courts 
worry that plaintiffs can simply assert a desire for redress for increased risk and 
anxiety and that there is no way to evaluate their claims with rigor or concreteness.  
Courts express concern that preventative measures to protect against future injury are 
merely “manufactured” to generate cost. The overarching concern is that risk and 
anxiety are speculative and subjective and, worse, susceptible to manipulation by 
attorneys who desire to manufacture injuries out of a data breach.  
 
In this Part, we contend that risk and anxiety can be assessed in a sufficiently 
concrete way.  Although risk might be difficult to measure with precision, factors 
exist that can be measured and quantified. Courts should determine whether a 
reasonable person would take preventative measures, and if so, assess the harm 
based on the reasonable cost of such measures. Whether, in fact, plaintiffs actually 
took such measures should not be the focus, as the test we propose is objective. In 
essence, risk can be assessed based on what it would cost to insure against such risk. 
A similar approach is suggested for anxiety. Courts should employ an objective 
standard, assessing whether a reasonable person would feel anxiety over any 
unmitigated risk of future injury stemming from a data breach. 
A. ASSESSING RISK 
 
1. Likelihood and Magnitude of the Future Injury  
 
Courts should examine how the use or disclosure of the personal data would affect 
the financial security, reputation, or emotional state of a reasonable person. If stolen 
data is posted on sites used by identity thieves, then a substantial risk exists that the 
data will be used for fraudulent ends.
140
 On the other hand, if a thief steals a car with 
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a password-protected laptop and the data is encrypted, then there is little to suggest a 
substantial risk of identity theft.  
 
From a risk perspective, the likelihood and magnitude of future injuries fall on a 
sliding scale. A significant risk can exist with a low likelihood of a high magnitude 
injury or with a high likelihood of a low magnitude injury. For a major potential 
injury, even a small likelihood is a risk worthy of concern.   
 
In many cases, it can be challenging to assess the likelihood and magnitude of future 
injury with any degree of scientific precision. This is because the potential uses of 
the data are vast. Nonetheless, there are factors that suggest the likelihood and 
magnitude of future injury. Courts can assess how different types of data have been 
misused in the aftermath of similar data breaches. Courts can look at the means and 
methods used to exploit different types of data involved in data breaches. Courts 
should examine the extent that breached data can be aggregated with other available 
data, and the harms that result from the use of the aggregated data.   
 
2. Data Sensitivity and Data Exposure 
 
Certain types of data are readily categorized as sensitive because their release poses a 
substantial risk of being used to perpetrate fraud and identity theft. Some personal 
data effectively amount to keys to a bank account, such as account information 
coupled with passwords; Social Security Numbers coupled with drivers’ license 
numbers; and medical insurance information coupled with dates of birth.  
 
Information can be sensitive if it reveals embarrassing or reputation-damaging 
matters that a reasonable person would want to conceal from others. The Ashley 
Madison hack resulted in the posting of highly sensitive information about married 
people’s desire to have sex with strangers and information about their sexual 
preferences. Beyond the embarrassment and humiliation, that data raises the 
substantial risk of bribery and extortion.  
 
These situations are easily understood as raising a substantial risk of fraud, 
embarrassment, or reputational damage. But that is not to suggest that the harm from 
data breaches involving more innocuous seeming personal data is trivial. Personal 
data does not exist in a vacuum. It can be readily combined with other data to reveal 
sensitive information and thus cause harm to individuals. For instance, it might seem 
trivial if information about people’s mothers’ maiden names is compromised, but 
this data is often used for password recovery questions, and could compromise the 
security of personal accounts. The same is true for data about people’s favorite 
books, places of birth, and other facts that might not, in isolation, seem to be 
sensitive.  
 
Compromised data does not exist in a void. The world is teeming with data, and 
compromised data readily be combined with data to cause harm to individuals. It is 
nearly impossible to figure out in advance all the possible combinations and 
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permutations.  But one thing is clear: As more data about a person is compromised, it 
will become increasingly more possible to make data combinations that could be 
used to injure individuals.   
 
The sensitivity of data – and its potential to cause harm – can be the result of the data 
itself like Social Security numbers combined with birth dates. But it also can be the 
result of the aggregation of seemingly innocuous data with other data. Sensitivity and 
harmfulness stem from the potential uses of the data, and data is often not used in 
isolation. Because of these facts, courts should be careful to avoid rushing to a 
conclusion that compromised data will not cause harm just because the data might 
appear to be innocuous. 
 
3. Mitigating Actions 
 
Another consideration is whether the potential harm is reasonably likely to be 
mitigated by other actions. Consider the leak of credit card numbers. Although credit 
card companies are not required to reimburse customers for fraudulent charges, 
many major credit card companies have a zero-fraud liability policy.
141
 Thus, where 
reasonable costs are likely to be reimbursed, this should be considered in assessing 
the likelihood of the harm. 
 
4. The Reasonableness of Preventative Measures 
 
Preventative measures to reduce harm can serve as guideposts to understanding risk 
in more concrete terms and to figuring out the current costs of future harm. What 
preventative measures are available to deal with a potential future harm? What are 
the cost and effectiveness of such measures? In the absence of efficient preventative 
measures,, what would it cost to insure against the risk of future harm if such 
insurance were available?    
 
The ultimate barometer for this analysis is reasonableness. Courts should look at the 
degree of the risk. If there is significant uncertainty, courts should assess the 
reasonableness of trying to manage the uncertainty. A component of reasonableness 
would be evaluating the cost of preventative measures in relation to their potential 
benefit. Costly measures for a small chance of a modest harm would be 
unreasonable. Inexpensive measures for a small chance of a significant harm, 
however, would be reasonable – these considerations are the basis of contemporary 
insurance markets.     
 
The objection that plaintiffs can manufacture harms by incurring the costs of 
preventative measures would have no bearing on our objective test.  It would not 
matter whether plaintiffs choose unreasonably expensive preventative measures or 
whether they pursue no preventative measures at all. An objective approach avoids 
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the problem of the overly-sensitive plaintiffs or the overly-cavalier ones. Courts do 
not need to take plaintiffs’ word for these things.   
 
In Clapper, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to understand risk. The Court expressed 
deep concern about people spending money on protective measures to manufacture 
standing. But there are ways to distinguish genuine measures from manufactured 
ones. The key issue that the Court should have analyzed in Capper is whether the 
decision to take any given measure was a reasonable response to the risk of 
government surveillance. Instead of certainties, we need to shift the focus to risk, 
because contemporary understandings of the world are based on risk. This is how 
nearly most of the business and scientific world operates – by seeing things through 
the lens of risk. Moreover, a requirement of reasonableness will limit the ability of 
any plaintiff to manufacture standing. Courts can analyze whether a person would be 
reasonable in assessing the risk of surveillance (or fraud) and in undertaking 
preventative measures to address that risk.       
B. ASSESSING ANXIETY 
 
As the law has recognized in other contexts, emotional distress should count as a 
sufficient basis to establish harm. A data breach might not exact immediate financial 
costs to people, but the leak puts people’s good credit history at risk of being 
blemished by fraudulent transactions in the future. That one’s credit is in jeopardy of 
becoming polluted can be the source of considerable anxiety, especially for people 
who anticipate engaging in pursuits involving their credit, such as buying a new 
home or looking for a new job. A data breach can raise a person’s risk of reputational 
damage, as seen in the Ashley Madison hack, and in turn result in significant 
anxiety.
142
 
 
But not every instance of emotional distress should be cognizable. Courts should 
assess whether a plaintiff’s emotional distress is reasonable under the plaintiff’s 
particular circumstances. This would help exclude disingenuous claims and those 
made by hypersensitive people. Reasonableness inquiries have weeded out frivolous 
claims of emotional harm elsewhere in the law and can do so in data breach cases.  
 
Elements of certain claims can be viewed as protecting against frivolous attempts at 
recovery for emotional distress. Consider claims for intrusion on seclusion and 
public disclosure of private fact torts: they provide redress only for privacy invasions 
that would be “highly offensive to the reasonable person.”143 Intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims can succeed only if plaintiffs can show that their anxiety 
was caused by “severe and outrageous” conduct.144 How might courts approximate 
such protections in negligence claims? Here too we can look to current applications 
of negligence law. Courts can assess whether the emotional distress is serious and 
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genuine, much as is done in cases involving workers with asbestosis who suffer fear 
the likelihood of developing cancer.
145
  
C. EXAMPLES 
The nature of a data breach provides significant insight into the way courts should 
understand and estimate the nature of the risk and accompanying anxiety. Consider 
the following spectrum of scenarios: 
 
1. Attempted Fraud Against the Plaintiff 
 
Let’s consider a data breach where hackers attempt to use individuals’ information 
for fraudulent purposes. As discussed in Part I, courts have found that if hackers 
obtain a plaintiff’s personal data and uses it for fraudulent ends, there is little debate 
about the existence of harm. Situations involving attempted fraud should be viewed 
in similar terms. They generally present sufficiently concrete evidence of a 
significant risk of injury. There is a very high risk of future injury in such cases, and 
courts should recognize that risk as cognizable harm.  
 
Suppose a fraudster obtains plaintiff’s personal data and sells the data online to other 
criminals. Although no one has attempted to use the information yet, a substantial 
risk exists that this will happen. Courts should find harm under these circumstances. 
The only thing to cut against the risk of injury is if the data by itself or in 
combination with other data poses little risk of potential criminal use. That would be 
true of data stripped of indicia that could be used to reasonably connect it to specific 
individuals.
146
  
 
To return to a recent decision, in Bradix v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., the court 
dismissed claims for lack of injury where plaintiff alleged that hackers obtained the 
defendant employees’ names, Social Security Numbers, gross wages, and state where 
employees pay income taxes and used the information in unauthorized attempts to 
secure vehicle financing appearing on plaintiff’s credit report because there was no 
proof that the attempts at fraud damaged plaintiff’s credit score.147 That hackers had 
personal data and attempted to use it makes clear that there is significant risk of 
future injury. Hackers—whose identities are unknown and remain at large—can use 
and will likely use the information for criminal ends sometime in the future. The past 
efforts of hackers make clear their intent to use personal data for fraud. The sensitive 
nature of the data increases the likelihood that hackers will be successful in future 
efforts to steal individuals’ identity for fraudulent purposes. Crucially, there is little 
that plaintiffs can do to mitigate the harm since Social Security numbers and names 
cannot be changed to avoid future fraud. 
 
2. Actual or Attempted Fraud Against Others  
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Suppose a hacker obtains personal data of hundreds of individuals, including the 
plaintiff. The fraudster defrauds, or attempts to defraud, some of these individuals, 
but not the plaintiff. That other similarly situated individuals have been victimized or 
have faced attempts to defraud should be sufficient to establish a substantial risk of 
future injury. 
 
3. Fraudster Obtains Personal Data But Use Remains Unknown 
 
In a number of circumstances, a fraudster has obtains a plaintiff’s personal data, but 
nothing is known about its misuse. In those circumstances, the precise motive of 
criminal hackers may be unknown. It is fair, however, to suggest that there is a 
substantial likelihood that hackers hope to use the data for criminal ends. Courts 
should not require proof that hackers had criminal motive. As a practical matter, the 
hackers’ identities are unknown and thus such proof is illusive. Crucially, there is no 
need to require it. Hackers’ criminal motive can be presumed. As the Seventh Circuit 
asked in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, why else would hackers steal personal data if 
not for criminal purposes? If a burglar breaks into a house and takes the jewelry box, 
it is logical to assume that the burglar is interested in the jewelry.   
 
Again, much like the analysis of attempted fraudulent uses of personal data, courts 
should consider the types of personal data stolen and whether that data alone or 
combined with other data is likely to be used for fraud. Courts also should take into 
consideration if there are avenues for plaintiffs to prevent or curtail potential 
fraudulent uses of the data.  
 
4. Stolen Electronic Device With Personal Data 
 
Suppose a thief steals a portable electronic device containing plaintiff’s personal 
data. Nothing is known about the use of the data. The device might have been stolen 
for the device or for the data. Thus, the risk of misuse of data is unclear. To assess 
whether the device was likely stolen for the data stored inside or the hardware, courts 
can ask whether such devices have a significant market value independent of the 
data, whether the thief might have known of the nature of the data on the device, the 
nature of the data on the device and its sensitivity, among other things.     
 
This case could go either way.  If the data by itself or in combination with other data 
is not readily useable for fraud, then this cuts strongly against harm. 
 
If the data is encrypted – and if the encryption keys are not compromised – then this 
factor would cut against finding harm. In those circumstances, it would be costly to 
decrypt the data, thus decreasing the risk that it could be used for criminal ends.  
 
5. Missing Electronic Device With Personal Data 
 
Suppose a portable electronic device containing plaintiff’s personal data goes 
missing, and it is unknown whether the device was lost or stolen. This scenario is 
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similar to the case above, although less is known. The device might just have been 
lost.
148
   
 
In cases involving missing devices storing personal data, the evidence generally 
would not support a finding of a sufficient risk of future injury. This is especially 
true in cases involving personal data that alone or in combination with other data 
would not be considered sensitive—that is, data that can be cheaply and easily used 
to commit fraud. However, if the data on the device is embarrassing or highly 
sensitive, then there might be sufficient emotional distress harm in the mere exposure 
of this data to others. Anxiety over the risk not of fraud but of the data being 
disclosed to others can be sufficient for harm if it is reasonable to feel such anxiety 
based upon the data involved. Of course, if the data is encrypted and the encryption 
keys are not compromised, then there would be no harm.   
 
6. Personal Data Exposed Online  
 
Suppose a plaintiff’s personal data is unwittingly exposed on the Internet for a period 
of time. Nothing is known about whether anyone saw or used the data.  This case is 
similar to situations involving missing electronic devices with personal data. There 
generally will not be enough evidence to demonstrate a sufficient risk of future 
injury, but there might be reasonable anxiety if the data is sensitive or embarrassing.  
 
7. Personal Data Exposed in the Trash 
 
Suppose paper records with plaintiff’s personal data are thrown away in a dumpster.  
The records are all recovered, but it is unknown whether anyone accessed them 
while they were exposed in the dumpster.   
 
The risk of future fraud and anxiety is lower here than the above examples. Unlike 
personal data posted online, paper records are more difficult to use than electronic 
data; the odds that criminals accessed the paper records, copied down the data, and 
left the records in the dumpster are low. The risk is especially small if the personal 
data is not sensitive.  
 
What if the personal data is highly sensitive? What if the data includes medical 
records?
149
 Given the low likelihood that such data was in fact discovered, anxiety 
about its misuse should be viewed as unreasonable. As a result, courts should not 
recognize risk and accompanying anxiety as cognizable harms.  
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8. Improper Access by an Organization’s Employee 
 
Suppose an employee improperly accesses records concerning plaintiff’s personal 
data.  Nothing is known about the use of the data. 
 
The analysis will depend upon the nature of the data and what the likely motive of 
the employee was.  A hospital employee snooping into a celebrity’s medical record 
can cause reasonable anxiety because of the exposure of health data.  This is a classic 
case of intrusion upon seclusion and there would be emotional distress harm under 
that tort.  
 
IV. RESISTING DENIAL 
 
Recognizing data breach harms has significant downstream consequences in our 
legal system. Judicial reluctance to recognize harm might stem from a desire to avoid 
creating more opportunities for litigation, especially class action lawsuits. 
 
The law has various tools to provide redress for injuries as well as to deter 
blameworthy conduct that leads to injuries.  In data breach cases, some of the most 
common tools include data breach notification laws, regulatory enforcement, and 
litigation. Data breach notification laws provide notice to people about data breaches, 
but they do little to redress any injuries caused.  The cost of sending out breach 
notification letters can serve as a deterrent, but these laws are often strict liability and 
are not tied to blameworthy conduct.  They thus do not deter the most blameworthy 
any more than the least blameworthy. Moreover, the cost of notification is not 
proportionate to the amount of harm that a breach might cause.   
 
Regulatory enforcement can be effective, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and state attorneys general, among others, have brought enforcement 
actions against organizations for data breaches.  Regulatory enforcement is limited in 
extensiveness, as regulatory agencies are only able to pursue a small number of 
cases.  The FTC, for example, has brought only about 55 cases involving data 
security over the past 20 years.  Moreover, individuals often have little say in 
whether enforcement actions are brought, and they lack much participation in the 
process.  Regulatory enforcement waxes and wanes as agency priorities and 
personnel change.  Not all state attorneys general vigorously enforce. 
 
Private lawsuits serve function that these other tools lack.  Such lawsuits allow 
individuals to have a say about which cases are brought.  These lawsuits bring out 
facts and information about blameworthy security practices by organizations.  They 
provide redress to victims, and they act as a deterrent.  But there are many flaws with 
litigation as a legal tool to deal with data breaches.      
 
One concern is that runaway class actions could bankrupt companies. As one court 
noted, “for a court to require companies to pay damages to thousands of customers, 
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when there is yet to be a single case of identity theft proven, strikes us as overzealous 
and unduly burdensome to businesses.”150  
 
One problem endemic to data breaches is one we will refer to as the “multiplier 
problem.” This problem is caused by the fact that organizations can hold data on so 
many individuals that recognizing even a small amount of harm will be multiplied by 
a staggering number of people. These days, even a small company can have data on 
tens of millions of people. Judges are reluctant to recognize harm because it might 
mean bankrupting a company just to give each person a very tiny amount of 
compensation. Do we want bankruptcy-threatening liability for a data harm that only 
causes people a minor amount of harm?   
The challenge with data breaches is that although the harm might be small to many 
people, it can add up cumulatively as hundreds and perhaps thousands of 
organizations cause harm to people.  Moreover, a small amount of harm to many 
people might add up to more harm collectively than a large amount of harm to a few 
people.   
 
Courts may also be concerned that class action lawsuits for data breaches often do 
not provide much in the way of redress to individuals.  These lawsuits can be slow, 
expensive, and punishing to the parties.  Lawsuits can be so costly and time-
consuming that organizations often settle just to avoid the pain of having the legal 
process resolve the case even when they think they will likely wins.  
 
Despite these concerns, which are legitimate, courts should not focus on them when 
evaluating whether there is a legally cognizable harm. Courts should analyze 
whether the law should recognize harms independently from the downstream 
consequences of such recognition. Often, these downstream consequences become 
conflated with the issue of whether there should be legally cognizable harm. Harm 
should not be denied merely because it will involve facing challenging issues about 
the form and amount of redress.  
 
It is true that litigation is a flawed legal tool, but the other legal tools to deal with 
data breaches have limitations.  New legal tools might work better.  But none of 
these points should lead to failing to find harm.  If there’s a nail that needs to be 
hammered into the wall, and a hammer is not available, the solution is not to deny 
the existence of the nail.  We reach this conclusion not just based on principle or a 
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blind commitment to conceptual consistency, but on pragmatic grounds. At first 
blush, it generally does not seem pragmatic to argue that courts should recognize 
harm even though it could produce undesirable consequences in the legal system. 
But there are undesirable consequences for failing to recognize harm, which include 
allowing harm to go undeterred. The consequences should be seen beyond the 
particular case. Data harms in any one case might not be large for most individuals, 
but aggregated across many cases, the harms become much more significant. 
Moreover, there are adverse consequences with conflating issues and not addressing 
each in an honest and direct manner. These consequences affect society’s ability to 
grapple with problems of great social concern. Not recognizing data breach harms is 
avoidant behavior that often leads to a poor response on two fronts. The first is that 
problems involving data harms are not addressed. The second is that specific 
problems involving the way our legal system functions are ignored.  
 
If there is a legally cognizable harm, then the law should try to address it. If the 
problem is that the forms of redress and remedies cause problems, then these 
problems should be grappled with directly rather than avoided. Suppose a person’s 
job is to pick up every apple on an apple tree. Some apples are high up in the tree 
and are difficult to pick. The person declares that they are not apples, so she does not 
have to pick them. Such an approach is not only dishonest, but also unproductive. A 
more honest and productive response would be to explore how to surmount the 
difficulties in picking them. Maybe a different method is needed. Maybe new tools 
can be created to pick the apples. Innovation and invention might lead to a solution, 
but this might never occur if the existence of the apples is denied.  
 
Denying problems stunts the law’s development and is one factor why the law 
struggles to respond rapidly and effectively to contemporary problems. Many of the 
reasons why data breach harms are not recognized as cognizable is because they 
push on many of the areas where the law is very gingerly developing. Some might 
argue that the law should turn away data harms until it is fully prepared to embrace 
them. That view, however, ignores the expressive function of the law.
151
 By rejecting 
data breach harms, the law is saying that they are not worthy of redress. It is 
suggesting that they are not worth rethinking existing legal concepts or pushing 
harder on newer developing areas of the law. What originates in a lack of judicial 
imagination and fortitude becomes manifested in terms of data breach harms being 
cast aside as insignificant or non-existent. 
 
It is difficult to set aside the law’s current difficulties when tackling the question of 
whether the law should recognize data harms. Bringing in the legal system with all 
its flaws might create negative outcomes. Shouldn’t we consider the consequences of 
how our legal system will handle a certain matter?   
 
The problem is that such an analysis takes the current legal system as fixed and 
unchangeable, and this is far from the case. The legal system will never grow or 
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mature if it is not challenged. The consequences might be worse in the short term, 
but this sacrifice might yield better results in the long term. Our legal system already 
has many different tools to redress harm, and has evolved considerably over the 
years. 
 
Moreover, the existence of problems with the legal system cuts both ways in a 
consequentialist analysis. Part of the decision about whether to accept and live with 
something is how well it functions. If it functions fairly well, then one might be more 
accepting of it. The further away it is form acceptable, the stronger the argument for 
changing it. Thus, the worse the failings of our legal system, the better it is to push 
on it.  
 
Additionally, denial of harm is not the only escape valve that the legal system can 
employ. Escape valves can be created at nearly any point in the process. Instead of 
addressing difficulties in how the legal system will handle cases when determining 
whether data harm exists, courts could address those difficulties and make 
compromises when actually handling those cases. Rather than create a fiction that 
harm does not exist, why not create other fictions more directly on point and 
responsive to the problems for which they are being created?   
 
Generally, those who cause wide-scale harm must pay for it. If a company builds a 
dam and it bursts and floods a town, that company must pay.
152
 But with data breach 
harms, courts are saying that companies should be off the hook and should not be 
made to internalize the harm. To the extent that there ought to be limits on liability 
for data harm, such limits are best addressed directly rather than through denying the 
existence of data breach harm. For instance, not all harms might need to be 
addressed via damages and could be dealt with through various forms of equitable 
remedies and declaratory judgments.  
 
The problems with our civil justice system and class actions exist in many other 
areas of law and for many other types of harm.  Data breach harms should not be 
singled out.  To the extent the civil justice system is flawed, this is an issue that 
ought to be taken up systematically, most practically through our legislatures.  It is 
not an excuse for courts to take it upon themselves to close off the civil justice 
system from redressing a serious and important type of harm. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Looking across the body of jurisprudence of data breach harms, it is fair to say that 
courts are reluctant to recognize to data breach harms. Various lines of cases that 
would support their recognition are ignored or narrowly interpreted. Courts rarely 
seize the opportunity to push doctrines in a progressive direction when it comes to 
data harms. By contrast, courts are willing to extend the logic of related lines of 
cases in other contexts. Yet for data breach harms, where precedent can be read 
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flexibly and creatively, courts will rarely take the opportunity to do so. In many 
cases, courts brush aside or ignore precedent that would support the recognition of 
data harms. 
 
With a better understanding of harms, we can appreciate why they are harmful, why 
the law struggles, and why the law needs to do more. Although there are legitimate 
concerns with recognizing data breach harms, not doing so is akin to being an ostrich 
hiding its head in the sand. The law offers a set of tools that can be used to address 
harm, from compensatory damages to equitable relief such as injunctions to remedies 
such as unjust enrichment. 
 
Our legal system needs to confront data breach harms because real costs are borne by 
individuals and society and because ignoring them results in inefficient deterrence. 
Courts routinely avoid hard questions and ignore the anxiety people experience and 
the increased risk that data breaches cause.. Yet in other areas of the law, courts have 
recognized such harms and placed manageable limits on their reach. As we have 
shown, those legal developments should inform how courts address data breach 
harms. A path has been laid to help us work through the complexities of data breach 
harms. 
 
Data breach harm might often be intangible, but it still is very real. Data harm is 
frequently risk-oriented, but risk management is a standard part of the way that the 
modern commercial world operates.  
 
There are regulatory enforcement mechanisms to address harm, as well as many 
possibilities for legislation. What is the ideal mix of these tools? Are new tools 
needed?  These are important questions to ask and ones we plan to address in future 
work. For now, though, it is important to note that these questions will not be asked 
sufficiently if no harm is recognized. 
 
In this Article, we have attempted to lay the conceptual groundwork for 
understanding data breach harms and to demonstrate the legal foundations that can 
be used to help the law grapple with data breach harms.  When the law fails to 
recognize harm, the costs of our data-driven society are externalized onto 
individuals.  These costs are compounding as data harms aggregate. Not recognizing 
data breach harms can lead to under-deterrence of data security violations as well as 
inadequate investment in prevention. Dealing with data breach harms will certainly 
be challenging, but the law is ready, and the stakes are of paramount importance.  
 
  
